

ELECTORAL AND PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES: POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEFINITION AND ARRANGEMENT OF RELATIONS

The article analyzes and systematizes different political and institutional perspectives of defining and arrangement of relations between electoral and parliamentary parties, as well as the options of distinguishing between them in representative democracies. This is done in view of the fact that parties in representative democracies play a major role in organizing and articulating the demands, interests and needs of different groups of voters. Accordingly, the issue of theorizing and understanding political and institutional perspectives of defining and arrangement of relations between parties as participants in elections and fractions as parties in the parliaments of almost all democratic countries in the world was put on the agenda. To do this, the author analyzed and structured the differences between such notions as “party”, “electoral party”, “parliamentary party”, “faction”, “caucus” and “coalition”.

Keywords: party, electoral party, parliamentary party, fraction, caucus, coalition.

Partie wyborcze i parlamentarne w krajach demokratycznych: perspektywy polityczne i instytucjonalne określania i regulacji stosunków

Artykuł analizuje i systematyzuje polityczne i instytucjonalne perspektywy definiowania i regulowania relacji między partiami wyborczymi i parlamentarnymi, a także fakultatywne rozróżnienie między nimi w demokracjach przedstawicielskich. Dokonano tego z uwagi na fakt, że partie w demokracjach przedstawicielskich odgrywają główną rolę w organizowaniu i artykułowaniu próśb, interesów i potrzeb różnych grup wyborców. W związku z tym na porządku dziennym postawiono kwestię teoretyzowania i rozumienia politycznych i instytucjonalnych perspektyw definiowania i organizowania relacji i powiązań między partiami jako uczestnikami wyborów i frakcjami jako partiami w parlamentach niemal wszystkich demokratycznych krajów świata. W tym celu przeanalizowano i ustrukturyzowano różnice między takimi pojęciami jak „partia”, „partia wyborcza”, „partia parlamentarna”, „frakcja”, „fakcja” i „koalicja”.

Słowa kluczowe: partia, partia wyborcza, partia parlamentarna, frakcja, fackcja, koalicja.

ВИБОРЧІ І ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКІ ПАРТІЇ У ДЕМОКРАТИЧНИХ КРАЇНАХ: ПОЛІТИЧНА Й ІНСТИТУЦІЙНА ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ОЗНАЧЕННЯ ТА ВПОРЯДКУВАННЯ ВІДНОСИН

У статті проаналізовано і систематизовано політичну й інституційну перспективи означення та впорядкування відносин поміж виборчими і парламентськими партіями, а також опціонал розмежування між ними у представницьких демократіях. Це було зроблено з огляду на те, що партії в умовах представницьких демократій відіграють магістральну роль у впорядкуванні й артикулюванні запитів, інтересів і потреб різних груп виборців. Відповідно, на порядок денний було поставлено проблематику теоретизації і розуміння політичної й інституційної перспектив означення та впорядкування відносин і зв'язку між партіями як учасниками виборів та фракціями як партіями у парламентах майже всіх демократичних країн світу. Задля цього проаналізовано і структуровано відмінності між такими поняттями, як «партія», «виборча партія», «парламентська партія», «фракція», «факція» та «коаліція».

Ключові слова: партія, виборча партія, парламентська партія, фракція, факція, коаліція.

Almost every democracy in the world is organized in such a way that it represents the interests of the electorate in the representative bodies of power, but certainly in parliaments. The fact is that parliaments in representative democracies are always popularly elected bodies, and therefore their formation and organization are certainly influenced by voters. In this sense, if not all, then almost all representative democracies – moreover, regardless of their type – are usually characterized by the fact that their national parliaments are formed according to political principles and political logic, i.e. on the basis of representing the interests of voters through various political organizations. And among them, the main role is played primarily by political parties, which organize and articulate the requests, interests and needs of voters. Therefore, purely in the context of identifying the relationship between civil society / voters and representation by means of elections, parties in one way or another become more or less represented in national legislatures, already after that organizing them and politically influencing their powers and functionality. This, in turn, raises the question of theorizing and understanding the political and institutional perspectives of defining and regulating relations and relations between parties as election participants and factions as parties represented in the parliaments of almost all democracies.

The stated topics in different times were raised by political scientists, in particular such well-known classics as J. Blondel¹, W. Crotty², M. Duverger³, L. Epstein⁴, B. Hinckley⁵, K. Janda⁶, C. Jones⁷, V. Key⁸, A. Lijphart⁹, G. Loewenberg and S. Patterson¹⁰, R. Macridis¹¹, M. Mezey¹², P. Norton¹³, W. Riker¹⁴, R. Rose¹⁵, G. Sartori¹⁶, E. Schattschneider¹⁷, F. Sorauf¹⁸, A. Stern and S. Tarrow¹⁹, and other scientists.

We, in turn, will try to organize and systematize their works in order to outline, at least on a theoretical level, the political and institutional perspectives on defining and structuring relations and relations between electoral and parliamentary parties (factions) in democratic countries of the world. In proceeding to consider the topic of political and institutional perspectives on the definition and regulation of relations and relations between parties as participants in elections and factions as parties represented in the legislatures of almost all democracies of the world we insist (at least in existing terminology) on the use of all the already traditional concepts and definitions used in the theory of political coalitions and in the theory of parties and party systems, although certainly related to the comparative studies of national parliaments or legislatures in a whole. Thanks to this, the presented research can be aimed primarily at assessing the role and relationship of electoral parties and post-election / parliamentary parties, to determine the role of such external and mediating variables of this relationship as electoral and party systems, as well as to clarify the systemic interaction of the legislature with parliamentary, including governmental and opposition, parties. With this in mind, it is possible to organize and systematize knowledge not only about the relationship between electoral parties and parliamentary parties, but also about comparing and organizing the actual parties of the legislature, as well as trends and prospects for the development of parliaments based on the assessment of electoral and legislative behavior of political parties, both in parliaments and outside them²⁰.

¹ Blondel J., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Prentice-Hall 1973.

² Crotty W., *Approaches to the Study of Party Organization*, Wyd. Allyn and Bacon 1967.

³ Duverger M., *Political Parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state*, Wyd. Wiley 1959.

⁴ Epstein L., *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Praeger 1967.; Epstein L., What Happened to the British Party Model, *"American Political Science Review"* 1980, vol 74, s. 9-22.

⁵ Hinckley B., *Coalitions and Politics*, Wyd. Harcourt Brace 1981.

⁶ Janda K., *Political Parties: A Cross National Survey*, Wyd. The Free Press 1980.

⁷ Jones C., *The Minority Party in Congress*, Wyd. Little Brown 1970.

⁸ Key V., *Parties, Politics and Pressure Groups*, Wyd. Crowell 1964.; Key V., *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, Wyd. Knopf 1949.

⁹ Lijphart A., *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian & Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1984.; Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.

¹⁰ Loewenberg G., Patterson S., *Comparing Legislatures*, Wyd. Little Brown 1979.

¹¹ Macridis R., *Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas*, Wyd. Harper & Row 1967.

¹² Mezey M., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1979.

¹³ Norton P., Party Organization in the House of Commons, *"Parliamentary Affairs"* 1978, vol 31, s. 406-423.

¹⁴ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

¹⁵ Rose R., *The Problem of Party Government*, Wyd. Macmillan 1974.

¹⁶ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

¹⁷ Schattschneider E., *Party Government*, Wyd. Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1942.

¹⁸ Sorauf F., *Political Parties and Political Analysis*, [w:] Chambers W., Burnham W., Sorauf F (eds.), *American Party Systems*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1967.

¹⁹ Stern A., Tarrow S., Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Parties, *"Comparative Politics"* 1971, vol 3, s. 529-559.

²⁰ Patterson S., Wahlke J., *Comparative Legislative Behavior: Frontiers of Research*, Wyd. Wiley Interscience 1972.

At the same time, this type of research exposes some theoretical and methodological difficulties and problems in assessing the relationship between electoral and parliamentary parties in the context of institutional and political structuring of electoral procedures and the composition and functions of national parliaments as such. Thus, on the one hand, not all researchers and not always treat all parties represented in parliaments (including by election results) as parliamentary or as factions, after all, some of them are represented by a very small number of deputies and are not relevant, and some are formed on the basis of the division of other parliamentary parties / factions. On the other hand, it is not always clear what is the reason for scholars to name certain parties and political organizations in factions and whether the latter arise purely on a party basis or may be associations of non-party deputies (for which names are sometimes used instead the term “caucus”, even if its status is similar to the status of the term “faction” in parliament), etc.

Combining these two problems of separating political parties within parliaments, as well as trying to solve them in some way, J. Sartori argues that political scholars are still “traveling through the growing jungle of party politics, not even knowing where they should be, start their journey, not to mention where they are currently²¹.” “This is due to the fact that the research literature on the separation of parties, factions, caucuses and various types of parliamentary coalitions is surprisingly confused in the sense that how it distinguishes factions (parliamentary parties) from parties (election parties), parties and factions from coalitions, factions from factions and so on. And this is actually evidenced by the fact that political science has not advanced much in this direction, at least compared to the situation that was half a century ago, when scientists said that the various classifications and typologies of party systems are characterized by “disorder and abundance of definitions²².”

The main core of this problem is the fact that political theorists and comparatives in the field of assessing political processes in parties and parliaments, including institutionalists, quite rarely articulate their attention on party-legislative groups or party groups in legislatures. Instead, they more or less focus on the relationship between the concept of “party” in its understanding of the electorate (i.e. the electoral party) and “party organization” (for parties in the election and post-election periods), since this interdependence is directly related to the level of democracy / democratization and interinstitutional relations in political systems. Even more so, as studies focusing on parties or factions in national parliaments very seldom describe party structuring at least a little “further” than its assessment, mainly in democracies. In contrast, institutionalists who mainly deal with legislatures and their institutional impact on entire political systems, as well as scholars interested in political parties, classify parliaments according to “many” variables and structural components, rather than focusing on comparing the nature of parties in legislatures and outside them. However, this can not help at all in resolving the

²¹ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 24.

²² Macridis R., *Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas*, Wyd. Harper & Row 1967, s. 22.

question of what parliament is in terms of party-political understanding of representative democracies in the modern world²³.

Accordingly, as a consequence of the complexity of defining parliaments in the party-political context, their classification is a gap, including on the basis of insufficient development and content of the phenomenon of parliamentary parties or parties / factions in legislatures, what is especially noticeable in the conditions of diffuse orientation of institutional and political structure and powers of parliaments, in particular concerning law-making processes.

J. Sartori, who examines the development of electoral parties and parliamentary factions in theory and in practice, tries to solve this problem in part, at least at the analytical level. He notes that the etymological and historical positioning of factions and parties as such is derived from the fact that they are “unfriendly” or “friendly” to the government and the executive branch in general. However, the researcher notes that such a dichotomy is historically and currently not entirely complete, as it should be supplemented by the category of faction, which started to be distinguished several centuries ago. In particular, according to the works of J. Sartori²⁴, E. Burke was the first to try to distinguish the party from the faction, without appealing to the category of faction (because at that time it was not typical to elect parties to national parliaments). This thinker, as one of the first proponents of the need to create and fill the content of the phenomenon of parties, argued that parties are a means to achieve certain ultimate goals and a functional association of like-minded people who pursue these goals. Instead, he insisted that caucuses (even though there were no party factions in parliaments, which were not the case in terms of not representing the people in power) were, on the contrary, groups interested in fighting and earning money, various dividends or conditional power. In general, Burke was perhaps the first political philosopher to place political parties within, rather than outside, the political system, albeit as such functional units, which in his time did not seek the support of the electorate, which revealed a significant irrelevance of his proposed understanding of the parties in relation to modern conditions.

However, over time, the logic of E. Burke, in particular due to the emergence, spread and intensification of suffrage, began to become more valid and relevant, since the parties in a democratic representation still began gradually, particularly in the mid-19th century, according to Duverger to position and be perceived as “parts of countries on a large scale”²⁵.

As a result, many scientists, including W. Crotty²⁶, K. Janda²⁷, L. Epstein²⁸, F. Riggs²⁹, J. Sartori³⁰, and others began to distinguish between parties by function and purpose, including

²³ Mezey M., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1979, s. 3.

²⁴ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

²⁵ Duverger M., *Political Parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state*, Wyd. Wiley 1959, s. 1.

²⁶ Crotty W., *Approaches to the Study of Party Organization*, Wyd. Allyn and Bacon 1967.

²⁷ Janda K., *Political Parties: A Cross National Survey*, Wyd. The Free Press 1980.

²⁸ Epstein L., *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Praeger 1967.; Epstein L., What Happened to the British Party Model, “*American Political Science Review*” 1980, vol 74, s. 9-22.

²⁹ Riggs F., *Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness: A theory of dynamic balancing*, Wyd. Sage Publications 1970.

³⁰ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

electoral and parliamentary, and then continued the debate over the separation of parties from factions, factions from caucuses and coalitions from those of interest.

However, the result of this academic and scientific process both initially became and over time remained largely confusing and uncorrected, as we can understand from the ideas of some scholars. Thus, American political scientists use the category of “caucus” mostly in a neutral sense, while European and other theorists use it in the sense in which E. Burke thought about caucus several centuries ago.

Summing up this situation, J. Sartori believes that the problem with evaluating parties is that the general theory of parties asks for preliminary information, which, in turn, will never be the future until there is a real general theory³¹. Similarly, F. Sorauf³² states that while at some levels the political theory of understanding parties is quite easy, intuitive and tangible, at other levels it is elusive, and what is significant is empirical. In the same vein, Hinckley argues that political theorists still do not know what a “political party” is when they argue that it is very important, and therefore they do not quite understand what is worth or not worth linking political parties and to compare their institutional and political importance³³. Accordingly, given this mess of information and knowledge about parties in political science, it is not surprising that the concepts of “caucus” and “faction” are also confusing and ambiguous. And this despite the fact that partologists and institutionalists still use certain, already classical, definitions of political parties as any political groups and organizations, which are represented during the elections and are able to represent candidates from the population to public institutions and authorities based on the election results³⁴. The proposed definition of a party is relatively valid in the sense that it at least partially distinguishes parties from factions and parties from factions, since parties are participants in elections, factions are parties in state institutions, primarily parliaments, and caucuses are parties or surrounding party organizations without representation or management of their members and candidates in state institutions. In this sense, the distinction between electoral and parliamentary parties in the context of legislatures is primarily along the lines of separation between parties and factions, and much less often in relation to caucuses in legislatures. Because factions as parliamentary parties are the main agents of the legislature, as they use and pursue both job and party image at the electoral level and therefore are partly a continuation of the electoral parties.

Nevertheless, even following the already classic definition of parties and their division into electoral and parliamentary, the need to separate and fill the concept of “caucus” in modern representative legislatures, which are formed as a result of national elections, remains quite obvious. Especially since parliamentary caucuses, as noted by the same J. Sartori, can be implemented in

³¹ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 106.

³² Sorauf F., *Political Parties and Political Analysis*, [w:] Chambers W., Burnham W., Sorauf F (eds.), *American Party Systems*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1967.

³³ Hinckley B., *Coalitions and Politics*, Wyd. Harcourt Brace 1981.

³⁴ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 64.

the format of both inter-party and intra-party or non-party groups in parliaments, and therefore they may be derived or non-derived from electoral parties and / or parliamentary factions. Moreover, caucuses, like any group, which cannot be assessed as parliamentary parties / factions (although they may be part of them), should be divided into ideological³⁵, tendentious³⁶, personified³⁷, as well as those that address specific issues. From this conclusion, in turn, it follows that the structure of the parliamentary party (faction) and its parliamentary behavior can be understood in terms of its possible division into caucuses. As well as the fact that parliamentary factions or even caucuses can serve as a structured framework for understanding parliamentary coalitions, which are typically understood as the union of two or more parliamentary parties (factions) and / or caucuses in the care of forming governments. After all, parliamentary coalitions are inter-party / inter-factional and / or inter-caucusal groups designed to form and govern the government (at least in the case of parliamentary democracies), while parliamentary caucuses are, in this sense, inter-party groups of legislatures that, determining the outcome of the legislative process, do not manage it independently. In a slightly modified form, this means that there may be a governing coalition in parliament, but it may generate problems where factions of two or more parties and non-party MPs (united or not grouped) vote together as a caucus – a certain inter-factional or extra-factional, but necessarily supra-coalition construction.

It follows, as noted by H. Eulau and K. Hinckley³⁸, that all research on the composition of parliaments and their composition by parties, factions, caucuses and coalitions should be divided into two models – internal and external. The internal model describes the key structural and cognitive-behavioral variables that characterize parties, factions, and caucuses within legislatures. Instead, the external model describes the strength and influence of parties outside the institutional framework of parliaments, i.e. through the prism of the electoral system, the system of government and the powers of all branches and institutions of power, and not just the legislature.

Therefore, thanks to the two approaches, there are sufficient grounds and tools to determine the characteristics of parties, factions, caucuses and coalitions in parliaments, which, in turn, are one of the components of the latter. In addition, it is the external approach that simplifies the distinction between electoral and parliamentary parties, as the focus in this context is on party and factional behavior in parliaments following election results. And this, in turn, applies not only to the parties themselves, but also to coalitions, both electoral coalitions or electoral blocs, and mainly parliamentary coalitions, which further characterize party or surrounding party groups within political institutions – especially parliaments. This is how the opportunity

³⁵ Seyd P., Factionalism within the Conservative Party: The Monday Club, "Government and Opposition" 1972, vol 7, s. 464-487.

³⁶ Rose R., *The Problem of Party Government*, Wyd. Macmillan 1974.

³⁷ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 74-76.

³⁸ Eulau H., Hinckley K., *Legislative Institutions and Processes*, [w:] Robinson J. (ed.), *Political Science Almanac*: Vol. 1, Wyd. Bobbs-Merrill 1966, s. 85-189.

arises to classify the types of parliamentary groups, and this, in turn, serves as an impetus to determine the peculiarities of their separation from each other and order in the legislature.

In contrast, when researchers limit themselves to the study of parliaments only, i.e. the internal approach, then they limit the structural and behavioral variables that characterize parliamentary groups – factions, caucuses and coalitions. Thus, the theory of coalitions within the internal approach, for example, describes what is the process of uniting political interests in parliament, which groups are united for this purpose and what is the purpose of this process against the background of the functioning of parliament, and therefore it serves primarily as a means of addressing the problem of political composition and composition of parliaments. However, as W. Riker convincingly points out, in political science party coalitions have long been a central concept of structural organization, but not only at the level of established and formed / elected institutions, but also in the course of their establishment and formation³⁹. This view is shared by B. Hinckley, who argues that the activities of the coalition are in fact a “small attempt at political activity”⁴⁰ or a kind of model of politics at the electoral and institutional levels or sections. The fact is that the coalition’s activities are aimed at the exercise of political power, a combination of conflict and coordination, and thus collective activity in general, and all this in total leads to situations that are governed by collective and mixed political motives, both at the election and post-election stages. Adding to the procedural nature of this course of events is the fact that it requires political skills, in particular in the form of coalition bargaining, compromise, mobilization of party support - both during the election and after them.

It follows that in this approach, parliaments inevitably emerge as collectives of people and groups of people who represent other people and who work through a combination of conflict and coordination, using power and coercion to promote the decisions they approve and make. Therefore, parliaments in this context should be perceived not only as existing political institutions of representative and collegial type, but also as environmental parameters used in testing various hypotheses and theories about the separation of electoral and parliamentary parties, etc. Since parties in parliaments are inevitably characterized by both the influence of electoral factors and the intra-parliamentary attributes of party groups, including stability, range of influence, tasks, goals, power, membership and size, etc. According to A. Stern and S. Tarrow⁴¹, parties, factions and caucuses in legislatures differ from each other in the degree of their stability. After all, in a two-party system, members of parliament, in the “ideal sense”, are members of one of two political parties, whose party membership determines voting, appointment to committees, awards, etc. Instead, in a more factionalized or fragmented legislature, the set and combination of factions determines each vote and appointment to one committee or another, so that deputies can switch from one issue to another. This is often compounded by the fact

³⁹ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

⁴⁰ Hinckley B., *Coalitions and Politics*, Wyd. Harcourt Brace 1981, s. 4.

⁴¹ Stern A., Tarrow S., Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Parties, “*Comparative Politics*” 1971, vol 3, s. 529-559.

that in some cases of over-factionalized parliaments there are systems of responsible parties that form government cabinets⁴², in other cases situational agreements between scattered party groups prevail⁴³, and in other cases, parties form appointments in committees, but inter-party caucuses often determine the voting behavior of parliaments⁴⁴.

The range of legislative or parliamentary actions covered by coalitions also influences the organization and delimitation of factions, caucuses and parties in legislatures⁴⁵. After all, in a parliament or one of the chambers of a bicameral parliament, each party acts difficultly against the other party, thus determining the structure and political positioning of the legislature⁴⁶. Thus, the votes of deputies needed to adopt the functional rules of the previous chamber or the previous parliament, in particular on the appointment of committees, and to vote on the election of the speaker of the legislature, are almost always "ordinary" party votes.

However, this conclusion does not apply to the variety of options and configurations of voting by parties, factions and caucuses on various national issues, as some party groups are not active in all issues discussed, but only on a limited array or list of issues⁴⁷. And this despite the fact that political groups aimed at solving specific problems can be formed both within a party / faction, and between them or between them and non-party deputies, etc. In addition, the actions of parliamentary groups are not limited to voting, and also include actions on the election of leaders, appointments to committees, administrative lobbying, and distribution of financial grants among public policy areas. Therefore, determining the range of behavior of party-political groups in legislatures is an important indicator for distinguishing between parties, factions, factions and coalitions, in particular in their electoral and parliamentary sections.

Another important aspect of party organization and party organization of legislatures is the distribution of tasks and powers between parties, factions and caucuses in parliaments. At the same time, the division of tasks is traditionally the division of labor, which in the case of representative democracies is realized or should be realized due to the fact that the parties have numerous party target groups dealing with different aspects of party order and function⁴⁸ and various issues, even though they are largely interconnected through systems of parliamentary committees. It follows that parliamentary groups change as tasks are distributed among them. In turn, the distribution of power in parliamentary parties is, in essence, a matter of centralization of power and its hierarchy. Thus, some political parties, for example, are endowed with a much greater hierarchy than other political forces in the legislature, although a similar conclusion

⁴² Schattschneider E., *Party Government*, Wyd. Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1942.

⁴³ Key V., *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, Wyd. Knopf 1949.

⁴⁴ Sinclair B., *Coping with Uncertainty: Building Coalitions in the House and the Senate*, [w:] Mann T., Ornstein N. (eds.), *The New Congress*, Wyd. American Enterprise Institute 1981, s. 178-220.

⁴⁵ Seyd P., Factionalism within the Conservative Party: The Monday Club, "Government and Opposition" 1972, vol 7, s. 464-487.

⁴⁶ Ripley R., *Majority Party Leadership in Congress*, Wyd. Little Brown 1969.; Jones C., *The Minority Party in Congress*, Wyd. Little Brown 1970.

⁴⁷ Williams P., *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic*, Wyd. Anchor Books 1966.

⁴⁸ Norton P., Party Organization in the House of Commons, "Parliamentary Affairs" 1978, vol 31, s. 406-423.

applies simply to the parliaments of different countries⁴⁹. In addition, the logic is very common that in parties where power is centralized or only relatively hierarchical, only a small number of leaders can influence the formation of the political course. Instead, in the cases of decentralized parties, the number of leaders is greater, and therefore more people should or can, according to theorists, speak about the strategic advantages of the parties⁵⁰. As for non-partisan factions or caucuses of non-factional deputies, they are generally located outside the hierarchical order or in accordance with an almost random order.

It is noteworthy that in parliaments that work according to the principle of simple (not absolute) majority in decision-making, there may be different combinations of distribution of tasks and powers of parties, in contrast to parliaments, which require an absolute or qualified majority to adopt all or at least part of their acts. Although this is not at all regulated by the attributes and characteristics of the parties themselves in the legislatures, instead it is another indicator of the definition of parliamentary structures.

As for the goals of political parties in the legislatures, they are also able to characterize the party-parliamentary and party-electoral configurations. At least since the party-factional goals in the parliaments correspond to the institutionalized norms in the sphere of political regimes. This is manifested, for example, in the fact that some parliamentary parties in some countries are fighting for a change in the current political regime, while other parties are not, although they insist on changing the system of government and inter-institutional relations⁵¹. At the same time, it is extremely important from the point of view of composition of parliaments to unite personal and collective goals of party-factional groups in legislatures. The fact is that parliamentary factions and parliamentary groups in general often or mainly act in the form of lobby groups, since they are characterized by the desire to achieve current personal goals, and parties instead should be perceived as a means of achieving collective goals. It follows that the extent to which a parliamentary group depends on personal and collective goals is certainly an important feature of the separation of electoral parties from parliamentary party-political groups⁵². In the electoral-political context, this is complemented by the importance of the moment who becomes a member of parties, factions, caucuses and coalitions⁵³, after all, the composition of these structural components of the legislature varies from country to country, and therefore determines the answer to the question of what they do. It is on this basis that some scholars note the correlation or relationship between heterogeneous and homogeneous constituencies (given that increasing heterogeneity in constituencies increases the intensity of

⁴⁹ Rose R., *The Problem of Party Government*, Wyd. Macmillan 1974.; Ripley R., *Majority Party Leadership in Congress*, Wyd. Little Brown 1969.

⁵⁰ King A., *How to Strengthen Legislatures: Assuming That We Want To*, [w:] Ornstein N. (ed.), *The Role of the Legislature in Western Democracies*, Wyd. American Enterprise Institute 1981, s. 87-89.

⁵¹ Jackson R., Atkinson M., Hart K., Constitutional Conflict in France: Deputies' Attitudes Toward Executive-Legislative Relations, *"Comparative Politics"* 1977, vol 9, s. 399-420.

⁵² Fenno R., *Congressmen in Committees*, Wyd. Little Brown 1973.

⁵³ Stern A., Tarrow S., Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Parties, *"Comparative Politics"* 1971, vol 3, s. 529-559.

competition) in the context of parliamentary elections in the formation of parliamentary coalitions as a result⁵⁴. This is manifested in the fact that the parliamentary party, which represents a heterogeneous constituency, behaves differently than the party representing a homogeneous constituency, which, in turn, affects the successes and failures of various party-political groups in parliaments. The size of party groups in parliaments deserves special attention in this context.

However, in this case it is necessary to address not only the assessment of the absolute and relative size of parties, factions and caucuses, but also the assessment of the role of parliamentary coalitions, especially the minimally victorious. The fact is that it is through minimally victorious parliamentary-government coalitions that political / party-political players in parliament can maximize their own electoral, power and political benefits⁵⁵. At the same time, the easiest way to estimate the size of party groups in parliaments, according to M. Duverger⁵⁶ and J. Sartori⁵⁷, is to calculate the simple / absolute number of parties in the legislature. Identifying the number of factions, parties or coalitions in parliaments is a simple task, but it should be emphasized that this approach is not always effective⁵⁸. But in general, determining the number of parties / factions is important coming out of the fact that the difference between multi-party, bipartisan and one-party parliaments is decisive, and drawing on the idea that the number of parties, factions and caucuses is related to the organization and positioning of legislatures. Similarly, the degree to which parliament is factionalized or fragmented is another, and possibly more important, component of the evaluation of national legislatures⁵⁹. And this despite the fact that the issue of determining the number or ratio of the number and size of parties in legislatures suits the internal and external approaches to assessing the party-political composition of parliaments.

In general, in this theoretical block of our study, we need to conclude that the various internal criteria and indicators of party-political ordering of parliaments are quite logical and reasonable in characterizing the party attributes of parliaments. This is despite the fact that such criteria and indicators are quite analytically different, although in a purely experimental and empirical way they are still related and interrelated⁶⁰. This reflects, for example, the assumption that interinstitutional and party-electoral relations, constituency structure and electoral formula / system, as well as existing socio-political divisions can inevitably be combined and determine the party-political structure and different components of parliaments. It follows that in addition to the internal approach to assessing the political or party component of parliaments, special

⁵⁴ Fiorina M., *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies*, Wyd. Lexington Books 1974.; Gerber E., Lewis J., Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation, *Journal of Political Economy* 2004, vol 112, nr. 6, s. 1364-1383.

⁵⁵ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

⁵⁶ Duverger M., *Political Parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state*, Wyd. Wiley 1959.

⁵⁷ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

⁵⁸ Blondel J., Legislatures' Behavior: Some Steps Towards a Cross National Measurement, *Government and Opposition* 1969, vol 5, s. 67-85.; Janda K., *Political Parties: A Cross National Survey*, Wyd. The Free Press 1980.

⁵⁹ Seyd P., Factionalism within the Conservative Party: The Monday Club, *Government and Opposition* 1972, vol 7, s. 464-487.; Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

⁶⁰ Key V., *Parties, Politics and Pressure Groups*, Wyd. Crowell 1964.; Sorauf F., *Political Parties and Political Analysis*, [w:] Chambers W., Burnham W., Sorauf F (eds.), *American Party Systems*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1967.

attention should be paid to external factors, which are interpreted in political science as quite diverse and many-sided, and therefore as amenable to different classifications.

In this regard, for example, researchers primarily appeal to the fact that the separation of parliamentary and electoral parties in representative democracies is due to the typology of the latter. It is in this context that some scholars divide all representative democracies into majoritarian or consensus democracies⁶¹, while others suggest focusing on phenomena and phenomena such as consociative democracy⁶² or a developing society⁶³, after all thanks to them, it is possible to further delineate and differentiate the functionality of electoral and parliamentary parties and to structure and explain specific party systems. Moreover, scholars in this context are either explaining the role of parties in democratic societies, or demonstrating how parties and legislatures help to consolidate and to develop states.

In this regard, scholars have traditionally argued that elections play a crucial role in influencing party composition and behavior in legislatures, including through the prism of transforming and comparing electoral parties into parliamentary parties. The particular importance of electoral rules and competition is due to the fact that they determine typically the relationship between parliament and society, on the one hand, and parliament and government, on the other hand. In this regard, L. Epstein believes that a characteristic feature of parties is that they nominate candidates for party labels for their further election or non-election by society during the election⁶⁴. It is in this regard, many scholars consider it appropriate to use a variety of methods to measure the fractionalization or fragmentation of party systems, and at the electoral and parliamentary levels, as indicators that depend on the size and number, respectively, of electoral or parliamentary parties in a country, which the functionality of classification of party systems in them expands⁶⁵. But, according to J. Sartori, this does not permit a comprehensive solution to existing problems, as the types of party systems and the parameters of separation of electoral and parliamentary parties depend not only on the number and size of parties during elections and parliaments, but also on their electoral, then parliamentary behavior⁶⁶.

This position of researchers becomes especially important given that national legislatures are not exhaustive or "closed" political institutions, but instead, those political institutions that influence and regulate political systems and systems of interinstitutional relations, for which the functionality and understanding of the electoral and parliamentary parties, respectively, are also different. Therefore, an important factor in this context is the function of the influence of the

⁶¹ Lijphart A., *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian & Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1984; Lijphart A., *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1977.; Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.

⁶² McRae K., *Consociational Democracy*, Wyd. McClelland and Stewart 1974.

⁶³ Boynton G., Kim C., *Legislative Systems in Developing Countries*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1975.

⁶⁴ Epstein L., *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Praeger 1967.

⁶⁵ Rae D., *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1967.; Rae D., Taylor M., Decision, Rules, and Policy Outcomes, "British Journal of Political Science" 1971, vol 1, s. 71-91.

⁶⁶ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

political system in general on the activities of the institution of parliament in particular, especially in its purely party-electoral context, as well as in the context of institutional and political powers of legislatures. In this regard, M. Mezi states that the leading function of parliaments is to develop tactics of state and political development, which is especially true for representative democracies⁶⁷. Similar or similar conclusions are held by other scholars, who clearly state that parliaments in the party-political sense are necessarily arenas of influence, but this influence is not static, but instead undergoes constant transformation⁶⁸. And this forces the same J. Sartori to motivate that in determining the powers of legislatures, the issue of classification of parties and party systems has always played, and will always play a decisive role and will have a leading potential⁶⁹. Therefore, in general, it follows that political parties that do not participate in the government process or do not have the potential to govern are less important than government parties, but they should still be taken into account and classified as such, that regulate the difference between the electoral and parliamentary arenas of party functioning.

All mentioned above shows that the correlation and relations between the electoral and parliamentary parties are of great research and practical interest⁷⁰. After all, the degree to which the external (non-parliamentary / electoral) organization of the party seeks to realize its aspirations to move to the format of internal (parliamentary / legislative) organization of the party is at the heart of the institutional and political issue of political representation in democracies. However, in some works and theories members of parliamentary parties are referred to as representatives, and in others – “agents”, but traditionally members of electoral parties are not perceived as one or the other. Given all the above, it is clear that the relationship between the electoral and parliamentary parties varies depending on the size, ideology and number of major parties in the system, but in connection with the differences between the electoral and parliamentary levels⁷¹.

This means that: the more programmatically controlled a party is, the greater the probability of external control of its legislators / deputies in the conditions of transformation of such a party from a purely electoral to a parliamentary one; the reduction in the size and number of the main parties makes it more likely that such political parties will be subject to external scrutiny, both during and after elections and in legislatures.

In this context, the combination of the results of elections to the legislature and the powers of parliaments, which are formed through the relevant elections, can streamline existing knowledge, because in this way it is possible to propose unique classifications of party systems at the legislature level⁷¹. Conceptually, the two basic classification variables of party systems at

⁶⁷ Mezey M., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Duke University Press 1979.

⁶⁸ Loewenberg G., Patterson S., *Comparing Legislatures*, Wyd. Little Brown 1979, s. 10.; Blondel J., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Prentice-Hall 1973.; Polsby N., *Legislatures*, [w:] Greenstein F., Polsby N. (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, Wyd. Addison-Wesley 1975, s. 277.

⁶⁹ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 121-123.

⁷⁰ Epstein L., What Happened to the British Party Model, *American Political Science Review* 1980, vol 74, s. 9-22.

⁷¹ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976, s. 128

the level of legislatures in this case should be considered the concentration of parties in parliament and dispersion of power, which forms or reveals the main reasons for the separation of parliamentary parties or transformation of electoral parties into parliamentary parties⁷². The first indicator – concentration – is typically quantitative, as it reflects the division of party systems within parliaments into one-party, two-party and multi-party, of course with a number of subtypes and related types (discussed in detail in different typologies of party systems). Instead, the second indicator – power dispersion – can be both quantitative and qualitative, but in general it typically reflects the extent to which parliamentary parties (as a result of election success) monopolize or divide political power⁷³. Accordingly, this means that the dispersion of power concerns mainly parliamentary and not electoral parties, at least in contrast to the first indicator. This is especially noticeable in the case of all types of party systems, except one-party ones, since parliamentary parties in them can distribute management and administrative functions in very different ways, especially if prime ministers, but also the election of presidents. It follows that the party-political nature and composition of the role of parliaments – through the prism of indicators of dispersion of power and concentration of political parties can vary from minor or minimal (in the case of one-party) to important or extremely important (in the case of both bipartisanship and multiparty system).

In general, on this basis, it should be emphasized that there are several important definitions that underlie the typology of party systems at the level of legislatures, as well as the separation of electoral and parliamentary parties in political systems. First, parties are calculated or taken into account not only when they are endowed with the potential for managerial influence, but also when they have a certain parliamentary size or parliamentary status. Second, caucuses are not parties, but groups without governing or managerial potential, albeit within parliament. Third, caucuses are mainly intra-party groups based on problem-solving, ideology, and personalism.

Fourth, the fragmentation or fractionalization of parliamentary parties, as opposed to electoral parties, concerns the number of parties with or without governing potential. In other words, it means that it is more influential for a party to be relevant in parliament than it is to be relevant in election.

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⁷² Loewenberg G., Patterson S., *Comparing Legislatures*, Wyd. Little Brown 1979.

⁷³ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.

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